Vol 8 2004 the edinburgh law review on codification from the perspective of an author from a Civil Law background whose initial training and practical experience in private law was on the basis of a civil code.
The civil code in question, the General Civil Code of Austria or ABGB (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), is itself of interest for Scots lawyers, for it was promulgated as early as 1811, 2 about the time when the flow of the Civil Law tradition and scholarship between Scotland and Continental Europe was finally interrupted in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. 3 As a result of the centuries-old common basis of the ius commune (Gemeines Recht) rooted in Roman law, certain features of Scots law can also be found in the Austrian civil code (ABGB), which retained them in a less modified way than more modern codifications. The ABGB is still in force, albeit heavily amended over the decades. The ABGB is undoubtedly old-fashioned beside the German BGB, the Swiss ZGB and OR, the Italian Codice Civile, or the new Dutch Civil Code. To a large extent it is an old code, in the spirit of Natural Law and abstract reason as the principal sources of law, 4 and essentially reflecting the usus modernus 5 of the Habsburg countries as shaped by the age of reason in the eighteenth century. 6 In contrast with the older Prussian Code (ALR) of 1794, it has not taken over the conglomerate of the partly outdated and conflicting casuistic doctrines of the usus modernus. 7 As a late product of the Austrian Enlightenment, it is short (1,502 sections), 8 relatively precisely worded, 9 and clearly structured. 10 It uses a language not too remote from force for the former Austria after its annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938, although, curiously, as from 1 April 1940 the "Land Austria" (the national-socialist bureaucratic term) ceased to exist completely as an administrative entity under public law within the Third Reich. 13 Since the Second World War, the ABGB has continued in force in Austria until the present day. It still has substantial shortcomings, in spite of numerous fundamental amendments over the centuries 14 and supplementary legislation in a large number of separate statutes. For every Austrian private lawyer it is, nevertheless, the "bible" (and appears to become more biblical and mysterious in some old-fashioned parts); it enjoys some ironic affection among Austrian lawyers; it stands pluckily beside the other codes; and it is a source of bewilderment especially for German lawyers (something Austrians tend to appreciate) with its slightly archaic brevity and directness, its generally down-to-earth provisions, and its perhaps idiosyncratic organisation following the scheme of the Institutes of Gaius: personae -res -actiones. 15 The writer is not aware of any serious project to replace it by a more modern codification. 16 11 Compare W Ogris, Die Rechtsentwicklung in Österreich 1848-1918 (1975) 58. 12 The ABGB also survived in most parts of what was to become Yugoslavia. 13 W Brauneder and H Lachmayer, Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte, 3rd edn (1983) 249, 251. 14 The first large-scale amendments were made in the three "Partial Amendments" in 1914, 1915, 1916 (the last one being the most important one) under the influence of the then new German BGB. They led to a substantial revision of the code as a whole. See Ogris, Die Rechtsentwicklung in Österreich, note 11 above, 69. 
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Scotland's mixed system combining Civil Law and Common Law traditions, 17 on the other hand, is viewed by some commentators as a model for harmonising legislation in Europe, 18 or even as a "picture of what will be … the law of the civilised nations". 19 If that is indeed so, this particular characteristic should probably also be preserved in a future Scottish code. However, the assertion of mixedness in relation to legal systems is often questionable. For example, it has been argued, probably with some exaggeration, that the Civil Code of Quebec is in reality the result of a reinforcement of Franco-Canadian at the expense of Anglo-Saxon legal culture, 20 driven essentially by political forces, and so it represents Civil Law with a few minor Common Law influences. 21 The notion of Scots law as a mixed system has also been qualified 22 and criticised, 23 and the idea that a mixed system must be qualitatively superior because of its foundation on a critical choice of the best elements of both the Civilian and the Common Law traditions has been dismissed as a myth.
24
Adopting a property law analogy, is Scottish private law "mixed" in the sense of commixtion/confusion, or of specification? Put differently, is Scots law a conglomerate of fragments and parts of Civil Law or Common Law which are, in themselves, relatively pure and do not necessarily influence each other much, or is Scots law the result of a true mixture of Civil Law and Common Law, a new matter composed of these two ingredients? 25 A conclusive answer can probably only be given in relation to individual, narrowly defined, areas, but the writer tends to the conglomerate version. One gains support for this view by examining statute law - 27 Brevity and flexibility are essential for a codification and these are achieved by using the right level of abstraction when creating statutory provisions. This problem, as well as the whole complex debate of advantages and disadvantages of codification, can be more satisfactorily discussed if a concrete example is taken as a starting point. The example in the present case will be the Scottish law of error.
B. DRAFTING PROVISIONS ON ERROR
The draft of new provisions on error is likely to go though the following steps: (1) restatement of the existing law of error in Scotland in an analytical and succinct way; (2) identification of areas which may be improved in a new draft -effectively an amendment of the existing law; (3) examination of the provisions on error or mistake in other jurisdictions and, if possible, identification of existing foreign provisions which appear to come close to the envisaged Scots rules, so that the foreign rules may serve as a model for the draft (although such a model should be used with due caution); (4) analysis of the implications of the draft provision on error for the remainder of the private law system, especially its legal consequences, in order to achieve consistency and to create and preserve the civil code as a uniform body of law: this involves issues of reduction of contract and restoration of property transferred under the void (annulled) contract, but also, indirectly, the principal criteria of contract formation; and (5) draft of the provisions on error.
(1) Outline of the Scots law of error 28 The law of error 29 attempts to resolve the conflict arising from the discrepancy The following forms and situations of error can be distinguished:
(a) Quality of error
If the error is uninduced, 33 a contract can be reduced only if the error is an error in substantialibus, that is, going to the fundamental nature or root of the contract. It is difficult to define the exact meaning and ambit of the "substantials": one may use Bell's classification of error in substantialibus as being an error regarding the subject-matter of the contract, the contracting person (if personal identity is essential), the price, the quality of the thing engaged for, or the nature of the contract. 34 This list reflects the basic types of error in Roman law, 35 but it is not exhaustive, nor does it refer to any potential differences between unilateral and common error, so that this analysis is of limited assistance.
36
Where error is induced by innocent misrepresentation the error must be material or, it is sometimes said, "essential", an ambiguous term. 37 The 
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(i) Error in transaction, error in motive An uninduced error is operative only if it is an error in transaction (in negotio). If the error was induced by the other party's misrepresentation, the error has effect, independent of whether it is an error in motive (in causa), or an error in transaction. 45 The distinction derives from the German legal family (where an error in motive is operative in exceptional circumstances only 46 ) but has found its way into Scots law. 47 If the error is in respect of circumstances outside the actual transaction, it is an error in motive; otherwise it is an error in transaction. In the case of an error in transaction the question is what transaction a party wants to agree to (intention formed correctly, but expressed with an error), while in case of an error in motive the question is why the party wants to agree to a certain transaction (intention formed because of an error, but expressed correctly). 48 The when the other party is aware of this (right expression of a wrongly calculated price). However, if the other party knows from the prior negotiations which price the first party is actually prepared to accept, and the first party then mistakenly quotes another (typically lower) price, he or she can seek reduction (error in pretio -wrong expression of the price this party is prepared to agree on). 63 In such a situation the particular price 64 has become part of the contractual substantials.
65
Usually such a situation (not confined to erroneous prices only) is referred to as "taking advantage of the other party's error", 66 which is, it is submitted, a somewhat ambiguous label.
67
An uninduced unilateral error as to the nature of a contract (and its legal effects) which has been committed to writing can virtually never be annulled, 68 and there no longer seem to be exceptions to this rule.
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The so-called falsa demonstratio is not an error in expression ("falsa demonstratio non nocet" 70 ): the parties use (in agreement) a description of the subjectmatter of the contract which an outsider would consider as incorrect, but the parties do not err in respect of the subject-matter itself.
71
Error in transaction (in the wider sense) can overlap with cases of, or be an example of, a breach of a contractual term or the nonpurification of an implied condition, as for example when the subject-matter of the contract is not in existence at the formation stage or its actual quality deviates fundamentally from the stipulated quality. 72 The stronger emphasis on contractual terms or suspensive/ resolutive conditions is a typical feature of non-codified (Common Law) systems where the parties cannot rely on an existing set of rules of ius dispositivum, 73 as are found in a code. This is one reason why the law of error has only limited relevance in practice. 74 Similarly, in English law, many mistake cases can be interpreted as breaches of a contractual term (for example, quality of the subject-matter), or as cases of frustration, and it has sometimes been suggested that there is in fact no law of mistake in English law. 75 Although Civilian academic discussion tends to deal with these areas more separately, in the doctrine and case-law of Civil Law systems there is an awareness of potentially competing claims arising from facts which could be construed as cases of error, initial impossibility to perform, or breach of (implied) contractual conditions (with different remedies or legal effects).
76
Some authors are of the view that the successful reduction of a contract for error renders the contract void; until then, it is valid, though voidable, and has all the legal effects of a sound contract. 77 Judicial opinion is less clear; 78 in some cases contracts under error are regarded as void in certain circumstances, 79 which would be the logically consistent consequence of retrospective legal recognition of absence of consent, hence no contract, due to the error in substantialibus. This leads to further questions, in particular whether or not ownership can validly pass under a contract under error, and, if so, up to which point. In this context it is also important whether there was an error regarding contemplation of transfer of ownership. 80 These matters would have to be decided in the course of a codification. 83 to the other party prior to the conclusion of the contract and the misrepresentation has actually induced the misrepresentee to contract with the misrepresentor. 84 The misrepresentation does not have to be the sole cause for the misrepresentee to conclude the contract but a causal link is necessary.
(c) Error induced by misrepresentation of the other party

85
When the misrepresentation is innocent, the misrepresentee can seek reduction of the contract 86 and restitution of the price, but only if restitutio in integrum is possible. 87 This includes the return of the subject-matter in the same state as before the formation of the contract. Otherwise (typically, where a third party has acquired an unassailable title to the subject-matter) reduction is barred.
88
Before reduction the contract is voidable, in other words, valid, unless the error is in substantialibus, 89 in which case the contract is arguably void, although there is no clear authority on this point. 90 When the misrepresentation is negligent or fraudulent, delictual damages can be claimed in addition to reduction.
(d) Error by both parties
It is useful to distinguish between common error, whereby both parties are under the same misapprehension, and mutual error, whereby the parties are at crosspurposes 92 (although the terminology is not used consistently in this way).
Common error is a real situation of error because there is apparent consent between the parties, but true consent is defective, while in the case of mutual error even apparent consent is absent. Mutual error prevents the emergence of a consensus in idem and there is therefore dissensus. 93 On objective criteria, offer and acceptance do not match and no contract has been concluded. Strictly If there is a common error, the courts seem to judge this situation according to the rules of induced/uninduced error, although their analysis is not always clear, partly because of the obscure meaning of the term "mutual".
(2) Areas for potential improvement
The Scottish law of error is perhaps an example of "commixtion" of the Civil and the Common Laws, rather than "specification", and it also appears to represent confusion -in the ordinary meaning of the word. 96 The law of error (or mistake) is notoriously difficult and controversial in all legal systems, 97 and a mixed system does not necessarily provide a better result merely by mixing the ingredients from different legal families.
A codification of Scots law may attempt to resolve the conflict between the concepts of (innocent) misrepresentation and error: these concepts are, nevertheless, irreconcilable because the Scots law of error is a component of the law of contract and deals with defects in the contractual formation process, while the English law of misrepresentation is conceptually still a part of tort law, although it frequently appears in the context of the conclusion of contracts. The claim for negligent misrepresentation can appear alongside contractual remedies, 98 What is common to all of them is that they do not deal with (flawed) consensus in the formation of the contract but with a (mis)representation, and in order to establish liability they are therefore concerned with the act and state of mind of the injuring party. The law of error, however, looks primarily at the state of mind of the injured party (from the point of view of tort law), in other words whether there is a discrepancy between intention and declaration (statement or act) which vitiates the party's true consent. Thus in the (classical) Scots law of error the focus is on the erring party, while in the English law of misrepresentation the focus is on the other party. This is also the reason why the term "essential error" under modern Scots law in the context of innocent misrepresentation is in effect redundant:
103 what is relevant is not whether one party is in error, but whether the other party makes a false statement of existing fact which induces the first party to contract. In a code this conceptual divergence can probably only be overcome, for example, by following the Civilian system of error with consistency, and by incorporating the advantageous elements of the otherwise abandoned Common Law system of misrepresentation, emulating its legal consequences within, rather than in addition to, the conceptual framework of the Civilian system. This may also serve to remove the terminological uncertainty of the expressions "substantial", "essential" and "material" error. An example of a foreign legal provision providing a solution broadly along these lines is shown below. An error in motive is only relevant if the error relates to the quality of the person or the thing and this is a "characteristic regarded in business as essential" ( § 119(2) BGB). In the interpretation of the German courts, matters are "regarded in business as essential" if they relate directly to the thing itself (in a wide sense, also assets etc), 108 or to those qualities of the person which are relevant to contractual 
(c) Switzerland
The Swiss error provisions are Arts 23 and 24 of the Swiss Law of Obligations (Obligationenrecht, OR). 112 In Swiss law, a party can rescind only for substantial error. The law provides a non-exclusive list of instances of substantial error but, in a manner typical of the drafting style of the Swiss civil code, it is within the judge's discretion to determine what constitutes a substantial or an insubstantial error.
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The first three categories in Art 24 describe the usual categories of error in negotio, error in corpore and in persona, and error in quantitate. The last category (Art 24(1)(4)) classifies an otherwise irrelevant error in motive (Art 24(2)) as substantial if the party's error concerns a certain set of facts which the party has (subjectively) considered as the basis of the contract, and which the party is also (objectively) entitled to hold as such, in accordance with good faith and normal commercial practice (error as to the basis of the contract, fundamental error, Grundlagenirrtum). Thus the error must have had a causal connection with the formation of the contract and both parties must have had a common idea about its contractual basis which was, on an objective view, an inevitable pre-requisite for entering into the contract. 114 An important application of the error regarding the basis of the contract is the error as to the substantial quality of a thing (error in substantia). 
(d) Austria
The Austrian law of error is contained in § 871 of the ABGB. 115 Under this provision, only errors in transaction regarding the main object of the contract or a substantial quality thereof are relevant, and reduction is not permitted when there has been error in motive ( § 901). The party who was in error can rescind if the error was substantial, and either (a) the error was induced by the other party; (b) the other party ought to have noticed the error in the given circumstances; or (c) the error was resolved in good time. This "theory of reliance" (Vertrauenstheorie) in the Austrian ABGB can be traced back to the draftsman of the ABGB, Zeiller, and even more so to his predecessor and teacher, Martini. 116 It contrasts with the theory of intention or will (Willenstheorie) by Grotius, Pufendorf and Christian Wolff.
117
"Inducement" means that the other party has caused the error, and it is irrelevant whether this was done negligently or innocently.
118 "Ought to have noticed" means that the other party has been negligent in failing to notice the representor's error. The error is "resolved in good time" if the other party has not yet acted in reliance on the contract. This rule represents an application of the res integra doctrine of the ius commune: 119 if the other party has already incurred expenses or disposed of property under the contract (for example, sold it to a third party), restitutio in integrum is no longer available and the contract cannot be reduced on that ground. 120 Common error has also been recognised as a ground for rescission in the case-law and in legal doctrine. The Austrian error rule has been praised as "most original, attractive and satisfactory."
121 Whether or not one shares this opinion, the Austrian § 871 ABGB contrasts with the provisions of other jurisdictions in that it considers the intention and acts not only of the erring party but also of the other party. This brings the rule closer to Scots law, although, of course, it is not a misrepresentation section in the sense of the Common Law. 
(4) Implications of error provisions for the rest of the code
As error concerns a defect in the formation of the contract, the consequences of a successful reduction of the contract under Scots law must be considered, including the restoration of property (in the widest sense) previously transferred. This is one of the most essential parts when devising the plan of a code. It could even be argued that a draftsperson has to have regard to the general underlying principles of transfer and re-transfer of property from the very beginning, as they pervade a code, even before formation and performance of contract are considered in detail. In some respects, the law of unjustified enrichment (restoration of property) is the mirror of the law of contract (transfer of property), not just its appendix. The planning of an unjustified enrichment system immediately prompts decisions as to the existence and extent of constructive trusts under a future code.
122 Surprising though it may seem, a really consistent logical framework is achieved primarily by a comprehensive underlying system of unjustified enrichment and restitution, the "chassis" of a civil code. A decision must therefore be made at an early stage whether the (derivative) acquisition of property in Scots law is to be causal, or abstract. 123 If ownership can only pass on the basis of an underlying reason recognised by the law (iusta causa traditionis), most commonly a contract capable of transferring ownership (e.g. a sale, but not a loan for use, commodatum), the system is causal. 124 Where the conveyance is in itself sufficient to transfer ownership, irrespective of the validity of any underlying contract, the system is abstract, 125 which is the present Scottish system, 126 although the authorities are not entirely clear in this respect.
127
Whether the system of transfer of ownership is causal or abstract determines legal solutions particularly in relation to double sales of property 128 and to the invalidation of contracts. Taking error as an example, first, it has to be determined whether the error renders a contract void or merely voidable, and, if the latter 122 On constructive trusts in Scots law see G Gretton, "Constructive trusts", parts I and II, (1997 applies, what the true effect of a reduction of the contract should be: does it render the contract void retrospectively, ab initio (or "ex tunc"), in the sense that it is deemed never to have been concluded? Or does the contract cease to have legal effect as from the successful reduction, but remain valid in respect of the time period before ("ex nunc")? The latter approach probably conflicts with the concept of error as destroying the contractual consent. If the effect of reduction is the retroactive annulment of the contract, in a causal system the transferor can reclaim property passed under the reduced contract (for example by rei vindicatio, condictio sine causa 129 or a similar remedy). This is because the transferee never acquired ownership, due to the deemed absence of iusta causa traditionis as the result of the reduction. This is irrespective of whether or not the party has (also) erred in relation to the intention to transfer ownership. Where the basis of transfer is abstract, error can only vitiate transfer of ownership if the error is about the intention to transfer ownership, for the validity of the underlying legal relationship is irrelevant. 130 This is of obvious importance for the legal position of third parties to whom the transferee may have passed on the property in the meantime, and ownership of it, as the case may be. 131 In an abstract system, redress is effected in such cases by way of unjustified enrichment, and that might tilt a decision in favour of a causal system, to avoid undue expansion of the law of unjustified enrichment.
(5) Draft provisions on the Scottish law of error
The suggested provisions are founded on three premises: (a) the issue of terminology and its conceptual aspects cannot be considered without large parts of a draft code in existence; (b) the current principles of Scots law of error are to remain generally unaltered; and (c) the problem of reduction of contracts, including its implications for the restoration of property transferred under these contracts, is dealt with elsewhere.
The following exemplifies the Common Law approach. An extreme example is given in outline for demonstration purposes without any suggestion that a possible future Scottish civil code would necessarily adopt such a style. 
Error
Interpretation
In this Chapter the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context: (1) "Error" means, under an objective assessment, a misapprehension as to a matter of fact or a matter of law relevant to the contract; (2) "Substantial error" means an error but for which the party would have declined to contract and which relates to the fundamental nature of the contract. An error as to the fundamental nature of the contract includes an error regarding the subject-matter of the contract; the identity of the other contracting party, if made essential to the contract; the price, if made essential to the contract; the quality of the thing engaged for; the nature of the contract entered into; (3) "Material error" means an error, though not substantial, which is sufficiently important to induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract; (4) "Misrepresentation" means and includes:
(a) the assertion of that which is not true, by a person who believes it to be true; (b) a false statement which is a breach of a duty of care owed to the person to whom the statement is made and which, without an intent to deceive, gains an advantage to the person committing it (negligent misrepresentation); (c) a false statement made knowingly or without belief in its truth or recklessly whether it be true or false (fraudulent misrepresentation); (d) a false statement made without deception and without being in breach of a duty of care to the person to whom the statement was made (innocent misrepresentation).
[…]
Reduction for error and misrepresentation
Where a person has entered into a contract (a) under error, or (b) after an operative misrepresentation has been made to him; or both, that person shall be entitled to reduce the contract and, in addition to the reduction, to claim damages, as the case may be, subject to the provisions under this Chapter of the Act.
Contract terms
If the error or the misrepresentation relates to a fact which subsequently has become a term of the contract, the party shall be entitled to claim breach of contract instead of reduction of the contract. 
Error
A person who has entered into a contract under an error shall not be entitled to reduce the contract if the error is not a substantial error, and if: (1) the error relates to the nature and the legal effects of a contract which has been reduced in writing; or (2) the error does not relate to the contract as such but only to the person's motive to enter into the contract; or (3) the error is an error as to law.
Misrepresentation
(1) Where a person has entered into a contract after an operative misrepresentation has been made to him which has caused the person to contract under a material error, the person shall be entitled to reduce the contract. (2) The misrepresentation is operative if:
(a) the misrepresentation has been made to the person by the other party to the contract or by a person acting for, or on behalf of, the other party to the contract; and (b) the misrepresentation is an incorrect statement of fact; and (c) the misrepresentation is a statement or positive misleading conduct made before the contract has been concluded; and (d) the misrepresentation has been the reason, or one reason, for entering into the contract, which has to be proved by the person seeking to reduce the contract because of the misrepresentation. (3) Where the party making the operative misrepresentation is not at fault, the person to whom the misrepresentation has been made shall only be entitled to reduce the contract if, following reduction, he is able to restore the positions he and the other party were in before the contract. (4) Where the party has made the operative misrepresentation fraudulently or negligently, the person to whom the misrepresentation has been made shall be entitled to damages in delict in addition to the reduction of the contract.
Common error
Where both parties to a contract are under a common error as to a matter of fact which is substantial to the contract, the contract is void.
[Remedies as to error and misrepresentation] …
The following is an example of the Civil Law approach. Again, this is an extreme example, inspired by the provisions from the Civil Law countries above.
Section 1: Error
(1) A party, who contracts under a substantial error, or under a material error induced by a statement of the other party, can reduce the contract. (2) An error is substantial if it relates to the elements which form the basis of the contract and without which the erring party would not have contracted. There is no reduction for a substantial error if it is the result of an error in the motivation to contract. (3) An error induced by a statement of the other party is material if it is deemed to be a sufficiently important reason to have induced a reasonable person to enter into the contract. If a material error has been induced without fault by a statement of the other party, and the erring party is unable to restore both parties to their positions before the contract, the contract is not reduced. If the other party has induced the material error fraudulently or negligently, the erring party is entitled to damages in addition to reduction [in accordance with section ...].
C. IMPLICATIONS OF CODIFYING THE EXISTING LAW
The example above from the law of error shows that it is unquestionably possible to codify Scots private law, but one has to reckon with significant changes as a result, perhaps less in Scots law as such, but certainly in Scottish legal culture. In this context, a "code" is understood as a comprehensive and coherent body of rules in a certain field of the law, with a consistent intellectual framework and terminology which form the backbone of its elements, legal concepts and areas of regulation. For present purposes, codification does not mean a restatement by "consolidation" or "statutorisation" 135 of existing laws, whether statutes or case-law, without incorporating them in a comprehensive and logical legislative framework: 136 that can be achieved in good textbooks.
The drafting of a statutory rule is the grouping and abstraction of sets of facts for which certain legal consequences (sanctions) are considered necessary. The higher the level of abstraction, the more types of facts are covered by the rule and its sanction. Conversely, the application or implementation of the rule puts the abstract principles back into concrete terms ("re-concretisation") in relation to a real set of facts in order to subject them to the sanction of the rule. High-level abstraction is generally typical of Civil Law countries, low-level abstraction of Common Law systems. In Common Law countries, low-level abstraction is traditionally found in the rationes decidendi of court decisions, which contain general rules that are applicable beyond the special case at issue. Often such a set of rules appears in the shape of a "test". Examples in private law are the "nervous shock" cases within the delict or tort of negligence. 137 This casuistic style of rulemaking emanating from an individual case is then reflected or imitated in the statutory law of Common Law countries. If the level of abstraction is too low, the test is only applicable to the facts of the present case and a few more cases with very similar facts. A code which tries to cover all these potential cases without attempting a higher level of abstraction becomes extremely extensive, structurally confused, unwieldy to apply and eventually unusable. It also resembles more a book of rigid compliance rules (with the need to amend them after a short period of time), rather than a framework of elastic and adaptable principles. One example of a "code" which shares many of 135 Consolidation could perhaps be defined as a private arrangement of the legal material, e.g. by academics and publishers, while statutorisation involves a legislative act. There is no consistent terminology, nor does the present author attempt one. 138 The main reason why this statute works at all is that it actually regulates only a small part of private and commercial law. The higher the level of abstraction, the more cases can be covered, and the rule enjoys more general application without ageing too quickly. If the level of abstraction is too high, the rule becomes vague and its application criteria unclear. In order to ascertain these, the rule has to be restated in more concrete terms by way of supplementary "lower-level" abstractions, normally court decisions that apply this rule and that are given a particularly high importance through subsequent affirming court decisions, and through legal doctrine (academic writing). A good example is the French law of delict which has been regulated in only five general articles of the Code civil (Arts 1382-1386). It was left to French jurisprudence to ascertain and develop the concrete application of these articles. 139 This approach of filling the empty metal structure with walls (to use a building metaphor) entails certain dangers: case-law and academic doctrine may develop unsystematically and in a potentially conflicting way, which defeats the purposes of a code. If a workable code is to be produced, the right level of abstraction, and a significantly higher one than in most current British statutes, must be chosen to ensure economy in drafting. This can be achieved when short statements of principle are used rather than extensive casuistic rules attempting to freeze fragments of existing case-law. The example above from the law of error shows that the Common Law version is unsuitable for much more than a single isolated statute (which is, however, acceptable in a Common Law environment). If Scotland decides in favour of a code, possible starting points for a drafting technique which endorses statements of principle can be found in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (1893) 145 which Maria Theresa herself rejected as too voluminous. 146 This rule may be difficult to follow, for lawyers are trained to have an eye for detail and to be as comprehensive as possible. Indeed current codifications have not always resisted the temptation to over-regulate and to obscure the framework of the code as whole. A nice little example of a redundant provision is § 118 of the German BGB, which deals with the legal relevance of jocular statements ("Scherzerklärung", notably in the German code): such representations, as one might guess with little intellectual effort, do not lead to contractual relations. Generally, however, terseness of the rules prevails over completeness in civil codes. This affects the interpretation of codified statutory law. Traditionally, a Common Law statute acts as a sword stabbing into the body of the common law to excise and rectify certain unwanted case-law developments. A Civil Law statute, especially if it is a code, is a skeleton around which the flesh of the case-law and doctrine can grow. In practice the difference is blurred, but it is mirrored in the interpretation rules. The construction rules of Common Law statutes, and their qualifications, are well known and need not be discussed. 147 In Civil Law countries, the rules of construction allow for more interpretative flexibility (and here I follow the model of the German legal family). 148 The canon of statutory construction comprises, in this order, the literal (or grammatical) interpretation, the systematic (or systematic-logical) interpretation, the historical interpretation, and the objectiveteleological interpretation. 149 The literal (grammatical) interpretation is based on the meaning of the words according to their general (and sometimes more specialist) use and the grammatical structure in which they are embodied. The systematic-logical interpretation relies on a codified structure of the statutory law: in which context, in view of surrounding norms or the same chapter or the whole code, can the norm in question be found? Material considerations prevail over formal ones. 150 A historical interpretation tries to ascertain the legislator's intention by consulting the travaux préparatoires. If these construction methods are unsuccessful, the objective-teleological interpretation is used, which tries to explore the purpose of the rule (ratio legis), and foreign legal systems may be considered in this connection. 151 There are additional methods, separate from the interpretation rules, when an unintended gap in the law as a whole (echte Gesetzeslücke) has been detected. These comprise the use of arguments per analogiam, arguments e contrario, a minori ad maius and a maiori ad minus, and as a last resort, of general ("natural"
152
) principles of the law. 153 Even from this very short and incomplete account one can see that the continental laws can be, and often have to be, interpreted much more flexibly to apply general principles to concrete facts. A codification in a Civilian sense is likely to require Scottish judges and academics to adopt a more Civilian interpretation style. This may be one of the biggest stumbling blocks, although there is some familiarity with the continental type of construction because of European Union legislation, 154 and it is also true that Scottish judges are increasingly familiar with interpreting statutes which regulate given areas comprehensively. A civil code should provide solutions for common and frequent problems, as well as flexible principles or yardsticks for less usual ones, which can then be solved by practitioners and academics guided by the existing rules in the code. Deliberate gaps in the law that are to be filled by judicial decisions are vital for a successful codification. The Swiss Civil Code shows awareness of that and orders in Art 1(2) that in the absence of statutory or customary law the court is to decide in the same way as it would do if it were a legislator. 155 In this respect, a code may also counteract the current movement to over-regulate, a spirit of our time which is in stark contrast with the motto of the Enlightenment, as expressed by Kant, to have the courage to use one's own reason. 
D. IS A CODIFICATION DESIRABLE AT ALL: FOR SCOTLAND? OR FOR EUROPE?
The arguments for and counter-arguments against a civil code are well known, and it is interesting that they have changed little over the centuries, 157 so there is no need to reproduce them here. 158 As demonstrated above, the use of comparative law within a codification project is certainly useful. Comparative law (partly in connection with legal history) is able to separate, highlight and compare different methods with which functionally similar solutions to various problems are obtained. It can draw upon concrete legal rules from culturally diverse jurisdictions to distil general and abstract principles for legal solutions to similar social and economic problems. But comparative law should not be used to prove superiority of one legal system over another, or to prepare the introduction of foreign legal concepts into a new code without prior critical evaluation. 159 One may take the view that a codification of Scots private law is no longer necessary because there will soon be unification of European private law. While it is probably not possible to make an unqualified decision for or against a civil code in a particular single jurisdiction, there is, in my opinion, very much to be said against a civil code for the whole of Europe (assuming for the sake of argument that this is feasible at all 160 ). While it may appear obvious that a comparative lawyer should object to legal unification, on the grounds that he or she would thereby be rendered superfluous, this argument should not be dismissed lightly. It is the variety of human cultures and their differences which have enriched other cultures, not their uniformity. Law is one expression of human culture. The imposition of legal uniformity across the nations is a forceful act and inevitably a process of legal imperialism, 161 despite the argument that some areas within the existing laws share many similarities. 162 It is not too surprising that the basic principles of contract law do not differ a great deal as between various European countries. 163 Obviously, the very essence of a contract is an agreement between the parties. If the concept of contract is to work at all, it needs as a prerequisite an implicit agreement that the conceptual foundations of contract formation and performance are broadly similar everywhere. 164 The whole picture changes if legal relations are not based on consent, as with regard to delict and property. 165 One of the major arguments for unification is expediency and legal security. 166 Following this argument through to its logical conclusion, one should perhaps promote the unification of Scots and English laws first. There is no need to wait for a unified European private law. The idea of codification itself can run counter to national character and culture. This may be the reason why a Civilian style codification of laws will never be successful in England, and a Common Law style codification (consolidation) will not be advantageous for either a Civil Law or Common Law trained lawyer. 167 The legal mentalité of the English, or their epistemological framework, is different from that found on the Continent -and both have the right to exist alongside one another. The French, for example, strive to eliminate any factual detail to establish a general idea or concept: the source of legal knowledge is the order, not the facts, and the emphasis is on universals. For the English the persuasiveness of a narrative 161 must depend on the way in which it makes it possible for others to replicate an empirical demonstration to which it relates. Thus in the Common Law world, any construction of an ordered account of the law rests on the disorder of fragmented and dispersed facts. 168 In addition, the English are ill-at-ease with systems of rigid and formal rules, and a code could represent exactly that for them. 169 A code is an intellectual construct; it rests on principles, and not on precedents -on ideas and abstractions and not on past experience, at least not from the immediate past. But for the English, pragmatism triumphs over intellectual ideas. 170 Scotland, however, could be a borderline case. The stronger propensity in Scotland for abstractions and systematisation may make it more inclined to the abstract concepts and ideas which form the substrata of a code. 171 Much will depend on how such a code is drafted.
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E. CONCLUSION: WHO WOULD SUPPORT THE ENACTMENT OF A SCOTTISH CIVIL CODE?
The legal profession in Scotland does not wholeheartedly support a codification project. Indeed the judiciary is vehemently opposed to it: 173 [The judges] were of the view not only that codification would not contribute anything of value and would therefore be a waste of time and money, but that it would be positively harmful. They considered that it would hamper rather than promote the steady development of Scots law and, in particular, would tend to freeze it into some form determined, not by judges in the light of concrete practical problems, but by a small number of persons not immediately exposed to the realities of practice.
Although the writer does not share the view expressed above, he has some sympathy for it, albeit perhaps for different reasons. The judges' major concerns are obviously based on the assumption that a code would be drafted according to the traditional style of Common Law statutes, and in this respect the concerns are not unfounded. The objections to a Common Law style of drafting for codification purposes have been raised above. In Britain, both north and south of the Border, a change of the drafting style is unlikely to happen. 174 A comprehensive ("codifying")
Common Law statute adhering to the conventional drafting style is always an unsatisfying compromise. It kills ("freezes") the creativity of case-law in the regulated area, and that is, from a historical viewpoint, the very purpose of an Act of Parliament: to react remedially and to correct the common law. It then tries to distil rules from decided cases, which naturally focus on the facts in question and do not normally state broader principles. The statute, which may also incorporate existing partial codifications, thus usually consists of an aggregate (or patchwork) of detailed and casuistic rules established by decided cases. 175 Such a statute is not a flexible framework but potentially a straitjacket. For a judge, the application of such a statute, without the discretion he or she would otherwise have in the field of the common law, and without the freedom of statutory interpretation of the continental judge, is obviously a joyless exercise in the sense of Montesquieu's statement that le juge est la bouche de la loi 176 (although that statement was never true of the Civil Law systems). The real problem for codification of Scots private law (apart from political issues 177 ) is whether Scottish legal culture is prepared fundamentally to change its approach to statutory interpretation: 178 the actual drafting is then a secondary matter. Codification along Civilian lines would undoubtedly change statutory interpretation. It is much less clear whether it would influence substantially the principle of stare decisis and the style and function of rationes decidendi. 179 It is arguable that the less detailed the code provisions, the less affected are the competence and discretion of the courts, given that the courts already deal with numerous detailed statutes which, in theory at least, do not permit as much freedom of interpretation as a Civilian statute. A code will not reverse the ranking of sources of law 180 because
Vol 8 2004 the edinburgh law review Acts of Parliament have always ranked highest. It is not necessary, and presumably not beneficial, to replace all existing common law by the provisions of the code.
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The code should prevail only where they clearly conflict. Case-law, whether preexisting, or post-dating the enactment of the code, can close gaps in the legislation. A Civilian-style code would not necessarily restrict the judges' power:
182 it may change style and concrete content in given cases, but not its ambit or quality. Thus it should not be impossible to gain support for a codification project from the judiciary.
The last important point, although unfortunately neglected by lawyers, is that a code should have some aesthetic quality. A musical comparison can be made in that a layperson may not recognise a brilliant instrumentation but will immediately notice a mediocre one. It is not surprising that Blackstone took a very keen interest in architecture, which can itself be seen as solidified music if one follows the Ancient Greek myth of Amphion. A law which is painful to read is unlikely to be obeyed and enforced properly, and people will not be drawn to the study and practice of the law if they have to surround themselves with gruesome texts. The French novelist Stendhal is said to have taken the Code civil as a model for his own style 183 -even lawyers are not advised to do this with UK statutes. Inextricably linked with the importance of elegance and harmonic proportion is the fundamental necessity not to regulate too much in too detailed a manner. A codification should never strive for total completeness and extreme precision. Humans are never perfect: if their law were, it would be inhuman.
APPENDIX
Germany §119 BGB: 1. A party making a declaration of intention, who was in error about its content or did not want to make a declaration with this content at all, can rescind the declaration if it can be assumed that he would not have made this declaration in full knowledge of the situation and with a sensible appreciation of the case. 2. An error as to the content of the declaration is regarded in the same way as an error as to those characteristics of a person or thing which are regarded in business as essential.
France
Art 1109 CC:
There is no valid consent, where the consent was given only by error, or where it was extorted under duress or induced by deception.
